


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
25 April 1962



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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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USSR: Foreign Minister Gromyko's 24 April speech to the Supreme Soviet suggests that the Soviet leaders are hopeful that a new round of US and Soviet nuclear testing will not prevent progress toward a Berlin agreement in bilateral talks with the US. In a relatively optimistic assessment of these exchanges, Gromyko said there are "some glimpses of hope that agreement is possible" and stressed Moscow's desire for further "serious talks" with a view to preparing "specific results" for submission to the heads of government. This formulation provides further evidence that the USSR envisages the bilateral talks as leading to a four-power summit or another meeting between President Kennedy and Khrushchev. Although Gromyko reiterated that the USSR cannot be deterred from concluding a separate peace treaty with East Germany, he avoided any suggestion of a time limit on negotiations and stressed Moscow's desire for a prior agreement with the West on "complex questions" related to a "peaceful accommodation."

In contrast to this moderate and hopeful tone on Berlin, Gromyko delivered a strong polemical attack on the Western position in the Geneva talks on disarmament and nuclear testing. He contended that the US decision to resume atmospheric tests "is meeting almost general condemnation" and repeated that the USSR will be obliged to respond with tests of "new types of its own nuclear weapons." [REDACTED]

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Congo: Premier Adoula, in his first public statement since Tshombé's departure from Leopoldville, said on 24 April that in the absence of an accommodation with Tshombé, the central government would request assistance from "friendly" Afro-Asian states in ending Katanga's secession. While emphasizing that he was prepared to resume negotiations, Adoula called on the UN to give its Congo Command a clearer mandate in order that it might "work more effectively" in solving the Katanga problem.

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The UN Command has been reluctant to bring pressure to bear on Tshombé which might precipitate a "third round" of fighting in Katanga.

Relations between UN and Katangan forces in Elisabethville appear to have improved following the UN Command's intervention on Tshombé's behalf at the Leopoldville airport. However, Adoula's public pressure on the UN for military assistance can be expected to revive apprehension in Katanga concerning UN intentions. Tshombé has indicated that he is prepared to resume talks in Leopoldville, but regards his own position as having been strengthened as a result of the airport incident and appears unlikely to modify his insistence on a loose Congo confederation.

Adoula is not known to have contacted any foreign power about military aid outside the UN framework. African states such as Ghana and Mali, although strongly hostile toward Tshombé, have been cool toward Adoula following his imprisonment of leftist leader Antoine Gizenga. On 24 April, however, the Sudanese Government issued an official statement which paralleled Adoula's criticism of the UN and called upon the UN to carry out Security Council resolutions with respect to Katanga.

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Vietnam: On 24 April, Hanoi broadcast a statement from the Vietnamese People's Revolutionary party--the Communist party in

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South Vietnam--warning that the party would, "if necessary," call on the North Vietnamese Government "to support the South Vietnamese people's just struggle," including aid in "material and men." The Communist-dominated National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam has twice before threatened to appeal for outside aid, but those warnings made no specific reference to the North Vietnamese Government or to outside manpower. In addition to promoting the idea of an international conference on South Vietnam by playing on fears of an expanding war, the Communists may be setting the stage for justifying more open importation of arms and manpower if this becomes necessary to counter US military assistance to Diem. [REDACTED]

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[redacted]

Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland: [redacted] The Federation-wide elections to be held on 27 April are regarded by almost all political leaders in the Federation--apparently including Prime Minister Welensky, who called for the elections--as a meaningless exercise. Welensky hoped to exploit his personal prestige among the white population to obtain an electoral victory which he could regard as a mandate for the continuation of the Federation in its present form. Among the white groups, however, only Welensky's United Federal party (UFP) and a small right-wing party in Northern Rhodesia are participating in the elections, which are being boycotted by all the African parties. Since 38 of its candidates have already been returned to the 59-member federal assembly, unopposed and without adequate discussion of the issues, the UFP's victory will be a hollow one. Welensky's maneuvers are likely to undermine his prestige and reinforce the belief of many observers that if any of the federal relationships are to be preserved, Welensky will have to go [redacted]

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*Argentina: President Guido yesterday issued a decree nullifying all provincial and municipal elections beginning with those of 17 December 1961. The decree also established federal control in all provinces which had not already been intervened by former

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President Frondizi. Military chiefs are taking over promptly in the provinces and in some cases have already announced appointments of provincial cabinet members.

Although the decree applied only to provincial and municipal elections, the preamble states that the executive power understands that the annulment should apply to the national elections as well and expects the congress to adopt resolutions in accord with the spirit of the decree. This would presumably mean that the congress would provide for a similar annulment of election results with respect to federal deputies.

The General Confederation of Labor, which is about fifty percent controlled by Peronists, has alerted its members to be ready to carry out a general strike to protest nullification of the elections.

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Gromyko's Speech to the Supreme Soviet

Although the Soviet foreign minister acknowledged that "many obstacles still remain" in negotiating a Berlin agreement, he appeared intent on assuring the US that Moscow is satisfied with the progress made thus far in the bilateral talks. He said these exchanges demonstrated the desire of both governments to "search for a rapprochement of positions."

Gromyko cited five questions related to a "postwar peaceful settlement" which, he said, must be settled "simultaneously" with the conclusion of a bloc peace treaty with East Germany. These include: a "normalization" of the West Berlin situation which would terminate the "occupation regime" and replace Western forces with neutral or United Nations contingents for a "definite period" of time; "respect" for East German sovereignty; legalization of existing frontiers of the two German states, including the border between East Germany and the Federal Republic; a prohibition on the transfer of nuclear weapons to either German state; and a nonaggression pact between NATO and Warsaw Pact countries. He also made it clear that the USSR will insist on the severance of all legal ties between West Berlin and West Germany.

Gromyko welcomed as a "step forward" what he described as the "US statement" that there are no obstacles to combining new access arrangements with the bloc's demand that East Germany sovereignty be respected. He contended that the USSR and East Germany are seeking to narrow differences on access guarantees and called attention to the proposal Ulbricht made last month for an "arbitration agency" to settle disputes which may arise in implementing an "agreement on free transit to West Berlin." Gromyko noted, however, that this international organ must not have any administrative functions that would interfere in East Germany's internal affairs and that it presupposes replacement of Western forces in West Berlin by neutral or UN forces.

Gromyko also termed US understanding of the importance of banning the transfer of nuclear weapons a "positive fact" and claimed that an understanding has been reached in principle on a nonaggression pact.

In a pessimistic assessment of the Geneva disarmament conference, Gromyko warned that "it would be wrong to think that the committee is close to working out real disarmament measures." He made the usual charge that the Western powers want to continue the arms race and that their proposals are designed to "undermine" Soviet defenses. He contended that the eight-nation "compromise" proposal for a nuclear test-ban control system supports the Soviet position that existing national detection systems are fully adequate. Gromyko did not threaten to boycott the Geneva conference after the US resumes atmospheric tests, but Soviet delegate Zorin told correspondents on 20 April that the USSR will walk out of the test-ban subcommittee. A member of the Soviet delegation strongly implied to an American official that the Soviet Union would test "immediately" after the US series begins. [REDACTED]

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